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In his most important book to date, Freedom is Power: Liberty Through Political Represen-
tation (2014b), Lawrence Hamilton offers what he describes as a realistic theory of freedom for
modern conditions, located in the tradition of Western political thought. It is in fact both a phi-
losophical and a theoretical argument with the former focusing on the link between freedom
and power, and the latter between power and representation, as reflected in the two halves of
the title of the book.
Thus, in the first three chapters of Freedom is Power, Hamilton offers his reading of a long-
standing and famous debate on the nature of political freedom, engaging extensively with
varying liberal and republican traditions, and looking to chart a path through them inspired
mostly by Marx. Most of the rest of the book, however, is focused on theorising what
freedom is power would mean under contemporary conditions, starting with critical
debates on power and domination, and moving to his key claim of the centrality of represen-
tation (and accountability) to real modern freedom.
Ultimately, Hamilton ends up in a theoretical position closest to republican thought, in
particular in the affirmation that freedom lies in participating (mostly through representatives)
in the process of making the laws that we must obey. However, unlike many republicans, and
indeed deliberative democrats, he does not imagine emerging through consensus or a
common identity or identifying something like Rousseau’s general will. Rather, after Machia-
velli, he imagines social as deeply divided between contending groups, and affirms partici-
pation in the public realm as instrumental to more rational, peaceful but conflictual
decision-making where the needs and interests of key groups can be articulated and
defended. There are resonances with Mouffe’s agonistic politics here, although framed in a
different tradition of political thought.
While much of the focus of the book, and indeed this special edition, is on the theoretical
account of the link between power and representation, Hamilton’s philosophical arguments
about the relationship between freedom and power are also important, and not only
because they are foundational to his subsequent realist theory because he links freedom to
power conceptually. It is with these that I start.
Freedom as a Philosophical Problem
In respect of a political philosophy of freedom, Hamilton makes three moves worthy of
attention. First, he argues that the distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ liberty made
famous by Isaiah Berlin is better conceive as a ‘private’ versus ‘public’ conception of
freedom. The basis of this argument lies in a critique of methodological individualism of
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liberal political through informed by, amongst others, feminist critiques of the gendered and
familial nature of all societies. This ontological error, Hamilton points out, results in the con-
clusion shared by Hobbes, Berlin and Hayek, that on the conception of freedom as non-inter-
ference, I can be free in an authoritarian society so long as the dictator happens not to interfere
with me (2014b: 20). Conversely, it means that a law passed in a democracy that does restrict
my behaviour, even if I support it, is a loss of freedom. On this view, Hamilton concludes,
freedom only exists outside of the state, in the private realm, where one cannot be interfered
with at all.
Hamilton’s second move is the claim that conceiving as freedom as entirely ‘private’ or
‘public’ is insufficient for modern subjects, we need both. Building on the argument that liberal
freedom is really a form of ‘freedom from politics’ (to my mind a view best illustrated by John
Stuart Mill’s peculiarly non-political account of freedom in On Liberty), Hamilton argues that the
growing role of political authority in our increasingly interdependent lives means that space for
life without political interference is likely to shrink rather than grow. It is simply naı̈ve and self-
defeating to try and avoid the state to be free. Rather, it makes more sense to try and influence
it, especially to try and influence the laws that we must obey. This move places Hamilton firmly
in the republic tradition of ‘freedom through politics’, which he embraces as necessary and
desirable for groups looking to secure their needs and interests.
However, unlike ancient republicans, Hamilton does not hold that freedom is reducible
to regime type. Following Constant’s argument in the liberty of the ancients versus the liberty
of the moderns, Hamilton notes that, unlike the ancients, we moderns have a different con-
ception of political subjectivity for which subjugation to the common good, nation or state
will not suffice. We have come to know and love our individual liberties, and it is simply not
realistic to wish them away. Thus, like Constant, Hamilton affirms a vision of freedom that
embraces both non-interference by an oppressive regime, and participation in political
decision-making for instrumental reasons. Practically speaking then, for Hamilton freedom is
a multi-dimensional condition that crosses the private –public divide.
These latters point speak to important differences between Hamilton and current day
republicans like Arendt, McCormick and Pettit. While the arguments are multiple and specific
to each thinker, Hamilton’s main thrust is a suspicion of various strains of elitism, especially
linked to virtue, whether in the form of virtuous political action for Arendt, a formulation
that appears to remove freedom from the reach of most other than ‘great men’, or in the
form of Pettit’s constitutional republicanism that focuses on common interests only, rather
than the interests of the majority, so limiting popular control over decision-making. Inspired
by Machiavelli, Hamilton is much closer to McCormick’s populist republicanism, although
Hamilton feels that the latter does not empower ordinary people enough to set policy
agendas rather than just to veto them.
Third, and relatedly then, Hamilton’s conception of freedom as not just about the
capacity to form preferences and decide between them, but to act on these too. Hence he
defines freedom as the ‘combination of my ability to determine what I will do and my
power to do it—that is, bring it about’ (p. 10). This is a definition of politics closest to Marx,
and draws tight the relationship between, forming a preference, choosing it, and the capacity
to act on it. As Hamilton argues, what is the point of being free to make choices if I cannot act
to secure these choices? Necessary to the idea of the freedom then is the capacity to act on my
choices, and this invariably involves relationship with other people, and hence the public
realm. Ultimately then, Hamilton holds that freedom must involve the capacity, or power, to
form and act on my choices, and this occurs in a complex, interdependent, and sometimes
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well-ordered social context and thus almost inevitably will be enabled or disabled through the
public realm.
Freedom as a Theoretical Problem
Having framed freedom philosophically as both the power to determine what I will do
and actually to bring it about, Hamilton’s places significant requirements on his theory of
freedom that is linked to an account of contemporary social and political life as substantially
interdependent and complex. Consequently, Hamilton’s generates a Hegelian style theory of
‘freedom as power’ across four domains. Thus, freedom as power requires (a) the power to
overcome existing obstacles in my life, (b) the power to determine who governs, (c) the
power to resist the disciplining power of the community, and (d) the power to determine
social and economic environment via control over representatives (2014b: 95). Critically, Hamil-
ton notes that these domains are not strictly definitional, so much as a list of the ways in which
freedom depends on power, and further that, for the individual, there is more to freedom than
dependence of power in these ways as there is always a personal and subjective component to
freedom. For society more widely, and specifically for groups, Hamilton believes that his
account offers ‘objective’ and ‘necessary’ conditions for freedom. They are objective
because they are shared by all in a society, and necessary because all in that society need
them too (2014b: 96).
Hamilton’s account means that securing freedom is demanding as it requires constant
work by both individuals and groups on many fronts. In addition, it is difficult work, as Hamil-
ton follows Machiavelli in imagining politics in agonistic terms of group (and usually class)
struggle (pp. 38–49). Hence he conceives of democracy as about institutionalised conflict
between contending groups, and stands in significant contrast to familiar republican accounts
of democracy as about constructing the ‘common good’ and/or ‘the people’. Freedom may
require that citizens are empowered to participate in decision-making in a free state, but
there is no ‘people’ undifferentiated by needs and interests. Rather, groups fight for them-
selves in the political process, and cannot be assumed to orientate towards the common
good. Debate is necessary and important to better accommodate competing views, but
deliberation orientated towards consensus is just unrealistic as a condition of legitimate
decision-making. Finally, but critically, everything is political, especially economics, and
whatever is contracted out of the decision-making process is lost to the project of freedom
(2014b: 173–91). A free society is one in which politics trumps economics.
Lastly, and perhaps most interestingly, Hamilton identifies representation rather than
direct participation as the primary form of political engagement to be institutionalised
under modern conditions (pp. 113–53). This is not just a pragmatic recognition of the scale
and complexity of modern life, but also a normative affirmation of the important role of judge-
ment in the political process, and the central responsibility of representatives both to better
account to their groups, but also to make choices informed by consideration of all views,
needs and interests at play in a debate. Freedom requires power, and power requires recog-
nition of the multiple dimensions of the social order that confront us. The contending
groups that constitute the social order require representatives to advocate for their needs
and interests in institutions that adjudicate laws, policies and decisions.
To give more accurate institutional expression to ‘freedom is power’, Hamilton advocates
for new institutions, giving by way of provocation, a list of four possible such innovations
including (i) district assemblies at the sub-national level to surface local needs and interests;
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(ii) a revitalised conciliar system, where representatives from each district are selected, prefer-
ably by lottery, to advocate for local needs and interests to the national; (iii) an updated tribune
of the plebs, which is an independent and partisan legislative house for the poor, equal to the
main house and (iv) a decennial plebiscite following a month long public holiday for citizens to
decide on revising any aspect of the constitutional order, in which any citizen can propose
changes, and through which vital needs (food, shelter, clothing, rest, exercise, etc.) of all are
satisfied before others needs and interests (2014b: 202 –5). These institutional reforms are
designed to surface social conflict rather than repress it, and to enable major social groups
the opportunity to create an environment in which all have more power, and therefore
more freedom.
As the focus of this special edition is on Hamilton’s conception of representation, I will
unpack this argument in more detail.
Freedom and Representation
Hamilton argues that, given the size and scale of contemporary societies, not only is rep-
resentation an inevitable part of democracy, but that most societies are deeply divided into
socio-economic, cultural, religious and gendered ways that enable group representation. But
what exactly is political representation? Following Vieira and Runciman (2008), Hamilton dis-
tinguishes three kinds of representation: the principal–agent form made famous by Pitkin,
whereby the group formally authorises a representative responsibility for carrying out
certain actions on its behalf; the trusteeship model, whereby an external party takes it upon
themselves to act for, what they claim, is the good of the group; and the identification
model, where ‘group members see themselves as having a presence in the actions of the repre-
sentative’, due to what the representative has ‘in common with the group: common interests
or similar descriptive characteristics, social perspectives, values and insights’ (2014b: 143,
emphasis in the original).
While all three kinds of representation are arguably present in different ways in the pol-
itical process, Hamilton ultimately holds that identification is the most widespread and impor-
tant, not least when properly understood from the perspective of aesthetic conceptions of
representation. Here Hamilton follows Frank Ankersmit (1997) in embracing an ‘aesthetic’ con-
ception of political representation, whereby representatives’ role is ‘to give the people an
image of themselves to reflect on’ (Vieira and Runciman in Hamilton 2014b: 146). Vieira and
Runciman write that ‘representative democracy depends upon politicians being able to
offer competing visions of the people to the people, in order for the voters to be able to
choose the one they prefer’ (Vieira and Runciman 2008: 141; quoted at Hamilton 2014a:
147, emphasis in the original).
Further, Hamilton notes that political representation must not just be a matter of poli-
ticians seeking to represent the whole people. There is also a need for an intermediate level
of representation, made possible by civil and political liberties, where particular groups are rep-
resented by would-be group representatives, and members of those groups can judge ‘which
version of those groups to which [they are] affiliated is, in [their] judgement, a good represen-
tation thereof’ (Hamilton 2014b: 150 –1). Group representation at this intermediate level will be
more a case of ‘self-selected representatives’—even simply ‘someone deciding they will stand
or speak for the group in question’ (139)—offering versions of a group on which they then
receive critical feedback from group-members by informal mechanisms, including (but not
limited to) whether or not they ‘attract a following’ (143).
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There are, Hamilton conclude, four components to effective representation:
(a) the nature and relative power of the groups of which one is a member, (b) the relationship
of representation that exists between the members of the group and the group’s representa-
tives, (c) the relative power of the groups’ (informal and formal) representatives and (d) the
relationship between one’s groups’ representatives and the formal political representatives
of one’s polity. (150)
As Hull observes in this edition, the achievement of an equally high level of freedom for
all thus depends, in Hamilton’s picture, on all socially relevant groups being well represented
formally and informally, and all group representatives having similar levels of influence over
the formal political representatives and government of a society.
Freedom Through Representation: Too Much, or Too Little?
Hamilton’s argument on the centrality of political representation to real modern
freedom is a novel and refreshing argument in a time when political thought tends to focus
more on accessing power through the courts and the defence of rights, or through partici-
pation in deliberative decision-making. These views of democracy map roughly onto the
right and left of the mainstream political spectrum. Hamilton’s view is that both these argu-
ments misunderstand the nature of politics, and the conditions required for many social
groups to influence decision-making. Crudely put, Hamilton holds that where legal challenge
is necessarily elitist, deliberation is simply unrealistic. The reinvigoration of democratic politics
requires revivifying forms of popular representation (and by implication accountability) in key
forums of decision-making. The problem we face today, Hamilton holds, is a representational
deficit rather than a generic democratic deficit.
In the papers of this special edition, Hamilton stands accused in two broad and divergent
ways: the first is that he is overstating the case for representation, and the second is that he is
not following his representation argument strongly or widely enough. In the first camp are
George Hull and James Furner who question the extent to which Hamilton’s conception of
politics and representation is really that distinct from the mainstream, and whether Freedom
is Power is overstating its claim to offer a genuinely distinct vision of democratic politics.
In this regard, George Hull argues that Freedom is Power is not as distant from delibera-
tive political theory as Hamilton makes out, and indeed that Hamilton’s account of popular
sovereignty could be strengthened by insights from deliberative theory. In particular Hull
draws attention to claims that pre-political preferences need to be tried and tested in public
deliberation; that public political discourse is, in significant part, orientated towards the
truth rather than just preferences; and that institutional changes can be made to a society
to increase deliberation in the political process, and enhance governance. Hull proposes
reforming Hamilton’s account of popular sovereignty, drawing on these insights, so as (i) to
overcome the problem of conflicting substantive norms through mutually agreed procedures;
(ii) recognising and affirming the inevitable role of reason and truth-seeking in the political
process and (iii) to include normative considerations that extend beyond Hamilton’s focus
on the ‘needs and interests’ of groups. These, he argues, would allow the reform of existing
institutions in practical ways that would enable legitimate and effective political action.
For his part, James Furner engages in an imminent critique of Freedom is Power’s, ques-
tioning Hamilton’s claims for the unavoidability of political representation, and for the desir-
ability of the political representation it recommends. In respect of inevitability, Furner
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foregrounds what he feels is a tension between Hamilton’s observation that the will to partici-
pate in public affairs is weak, and the requirement, by definition, that power requires action,
and thus political power requires action in the public realm. Furner also raises questions
about the inconsistent meaning of representation as on the one hand, a form of division of
labour, and on the other, a monopoly of a limited number of positions. In terms of desirability,
Furner questions whether the metaphorical language of maintaining a gap of representation
really does justice to the problem of ‘true’ preference-formation prior to or through the politi-
cal process, and to the problem of the claim by some to monopolise leadership of the people.
Lastly, Furner casts doubt on whether the practical reforms that Hamilton’s recommends will
really enable political representation to manifest and promote freedom or overcome domina-
tion. Ultimately, Furner is raising the question of whether Hamilton’s argument is as substan-
tive and distinctive as he claims.
If Hull and Furner can be seen as questioning whether Hamilton is pushing the claim of
representation as central to democracy unjustifiably too far, Thomassen, Henao-Castro and
Motimele makes arguments of the kind that Hamilton has not pursued the problem of rep-
resentation far enough. Thus, Lasse Thomassen locates Hamilton’s conception of aesthetic rep-
resentation as part of the representative and constructivist turns. On this account,
representation extends beyond formal institutions into civil society public and discursive
realms, and is the process through which groups come to be constituted rather than reflecting
pre-existing social realities. Inspired by Derrida, Thomassen argues that Hamilton does not take
the representational and constructivist turns fully enough. First, the notion of human needs,
which plays a central role in Hamilton’s work, occupies an ambiguous position as sometimes
constituted through representation, and sometimes non- or pre-representational. Second, Tho-
massen argues that Hamilton tends to limit political representation to political institutions
because he does not treat all political representation as itself representational. In both
cases, Thomassen concludes, limiting the effects of the representative and constructivist
turns risks limiting freedom as power. This comes particularly at the expense of activist politics
that requires ‘continuous and inexhaustible critique of, and resistance to, forms and con-
ceptions of representation that produce and reproduce relations of domination’.
Andres Henao-Castro follows Thomassen in pushing Hamilton for a more radical reading
of politics and economics, particularly as regards Hamilton’s claims to realism. Henao-Castro
places Hamilton’s concept of ‘real modern freedom’ in conversation with a Lacanian notion
of the Real, yet one he argues that he argues ‘invests the Real with the historically differen-
tiated modes of concrete racialized and gendered labor that capitalism obscures in order to
create value’. Drawing from critical race theory, Henao-Castro argues against the reformist
impulse to improve the representational reach of ‘liberal masks’. Instead, he advances a
version of political representation that argues for the ‘crack in the mask’ as the symptom
that reminds us of the Real, the irreducible antagonism at the heart of the social. In the
spirit of Rancière, Henao-Castro advocates for a politics of the disruption of the order that
makes the ‘unseen’, and thus brings representation itself into crisis.
Moshibidu Motimele’s paper shares Henao-Castro’s radical sensibility in respect of the
forms of exclusion manifest under liberal-capitalism, especially as regards the category of
citizenship. She argues that not only are the exclusionary categories that exist in relation to
state-based citizenship on the rise, but also that liberal rights discourses and participatory
democratic models fail to acknowledge the ways in which the genealogy of the concept of citi-
zenship emerges within a repressive context. Key to modern statehood Motimele holds is a
necessity to exclude and to alienate. Consequently, in his mistaken state-centric assumption
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that citizenship is (i) inherently democratic and (ii) the best framework from which to conceive
of freedom and power, Hamilton is unthinkingly excluding significant groups of people from
democracy. By implication, Motimele concludes, real freedom as power requires both power
beyond the state, and inclusive political subjectivities beyond citizenship.
Beyond Representation
Hamilton defends his arguments around representation in the closing paper in this
special edition, and thus readers can form their own assessment of the virtues of cases
brought by his critics. There is, however, one last point I would like to bring to general atten-
tion, and that is the particular relevance of the framing of Freedom is Power to the global south.
Framed as a practical theory of freedom based on appeals to realism rather than univer-
sal principles, and introduced in respect of the South African context, Freedom is Power moves
from assumptions about the demos and politics that resonate across the global south, and
increasingly in the more developed north with the rise of multiculturalism through migration,
and the politics of war refugees and terrorism. Further, Hamilton’s work resonates with the
empirical reality of a deep desire for the state, and for political rule over the economy held
by the vast majority of people in the global south. It also suggests, against pejorative associ-
ations of this desire for the state with clientelism, patronage and corruption, that what is really
at stake in this desire is freedom.
Indeed, it is not just that starting with the reality of difference and conflict in the design
of political institutions, even those committed to values like freedom, seems more sensible
than the aspirational end point of an ideal-speech situation for instance. It is also that we
do not require the mono-theism of the ideal-speech situation, or the general will, or overlap-
ping consensus to approach political legitimacy. We can be as we are, fractured and fractious,
and yet resolve or manage our conflict peacefully through our avatars in the political system.
By strengthening the institutional relationship between representatives and social groups, and
especially by affirming the importance of the control of the economic by the political, Hamilton
offers a vision significantly different from Dahl’s liberal pluralism. At the same time, by insisting
on maintaining a gap between the represented and representations, Hamilton pushes back
against totalising forms of political power associated with one-party systems and state
socialism.
Lastly, Hamilton’s appeal to realism links freedom to a conception of politics that does
not begin with a particular idea of ethical behaviour or moral world view. Rather it locates
freedom as a practical problem of action against a background of real world challenges regard-
less of whether one believes that equality is the sovereign virtue, or whatever other more per-
sonal conception of the good life is embraced. Notably, Hamilton’s conception of freedom
does not require us to want to be good people. In this sense, it is a more inclusive conception
of freedom for people concerned with the practical knowledge of living rather than theoretical
knowledge of the ideal.
Overall, Freedom is Power is a refreshing and challenging book that confronts main-
stream liberal, deliberative democratic and republican thought. It places power at the centre
of freedom, it affirms conflict over consensus, representation over participation, and reasserts
the necessity of political rule over economic governance. For all its anti-idealism, there is some-
thing very empowering about the way freedom is linked to conflict, representation and every-
day life, in a way that resonates with politics in the global south. Freedom is thus made
quotidian and accessible, not just confined to episodic elections and a mediated public
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realm. In small part an homage to Marx, if Marx had chosen to be a political scientist rather than
a political-economist, and in significant part a reincarnation of Machiavelli for post-structuralist
times, Freedom is Power returns us to the core problem of the idea of freedom—the inescap-
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